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New York State Ethics Commission
Alfred E. Smith State Office Bldg.
80 South Swan Street, 11th Floor, Suite 1147
Albany, NY 12210
| Advisory Opinion No. 03-8: |
Whether a former Attorney General’s Office [ ] may assist a client in
an investigation by the Securities Exchange Commission involving
similar issues that are currently being investigated by the Attorney
General’s Office, and whether his involvement in the early stages of
the Attorney General’s investigation rose to the level of direct
concern and personal participation or active consideration of a
transaction so as to trigger application of the lifetime bar.
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INTRODUCTION
[The former State employee] was employed with the New York State
Attorney General’s Office (“AG”) as [ ] of the Investment
Protection and Securities Bureau from [date] through [date], when
he left to join [a securities firm] on [date] as a [senior
officer]. In his new post, he will report to [the firm’s]
chief legal officer. He now seeks guidance on the application
of the post-employment restrictions to his current position and its
impact on his ability to participate in an on-going and broadening
probe into the trading practices of mutual funds. Currently,
the AG, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the National Association
of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), the Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), and other jurisdictions are investigating facts and
circumstances surrounding the sale of mutual funds at [the firm].1
BACKGROUND
[The former State employee] was a central figure in the AG’s
investigation of alleged conflicts of interest in the use of
corporate research at [a different securities firm], which began in
mid-2001, and which led to sweeping reform starting in April 2002
when ten Wall Street securities firms, including [the firm where he
now is employed], entered into a settlement with state and federal
regulators, in which they agreed to pay a $1.4 billion penalty and
separate analytic research from investment banking. The
Global Resolution was not signed by [the firm] until [date].2 [The firm] has complied
with its terms, and [the former State employee] asserts that he had
no significant dealings with [the firm] for the remainder of his
employment with the AG’s Office.
The AG’s Investigation Into The Trading Practices of Mutual
Funds
During the late Spring of 2003, the AG began a general inquiry into
conflicts of interest in the mutual fund industry. Soon
thereafter, the AG received information concerning two particular
practices:
“late trading”, which involves purchasing mutual fund shares at the 4
p.m. price after the market has closed, and “market timing,” which is
an investment technique involving short-term, “in and out” trading of
mutual fund shares, which has a detrimental effect on the long-term
shareholders for whom mutual funds are designed.3 Late trading is prohibited by
the Martin Act (see, General Business Law, Article 23-A), and
SEC regulations. 4 The
investigation quickly focused on the activities of, and the
relationship between, a hedge fund named Canary Capital Partners, LLC
(“Canary”) and a mutual fund run by Bank of America. [The former
State employee] states that “almost all” of his supervisory
involvement was related to these parties and their trading
conduct.
On July 18, 2003, Assistant Attorneys General (“AAG”) [ ] and [ ]
prepared a subpoena duces tecum signed by [ ] to [the firm] concerning
two of its brokers: [ ] and [ ].5 The subpoena asks for material
concerning time trading and late trading practices at [the
firm]. The subpoena does not relate to Canary or Bank of
America. [The former State employee] maintains that he was
unaware of the subpoena nor its substance.
Five days later, on July 23, 2003, [the former State employee] met
with the General Counsel for [the firm] and discussed the terms of his
potential employment. Shortly thereafter, in
consultation with AG counsel [ ], [the former State
employee] recused himself from any work or information concerning [the
firm]. The AG erected a “complete wall,” according to [the
former State employee], and, consequently, he never learned of any new
information concerning [the firm] in the mutual fund
investigation. [The former State employee] states that during
this time frame he was still unaware of the [ ] subpoena.
On or about July 31, 2003, negotiations between [the firm] and [the
former State employee] reached a point where [the former State
employee] recused himself from all securities-related
matters. [The former State employee] has since learned that, on
August 21, 2003, Assistant Attorney General [ ] sent a second, broader
subpoena to [the firm] seeking information concerning late trading and
time trading of mutual funds beyond the two previously mentioned
brokers. [The former State employee] believes similar subpoenas
were sent to other Wall Street firms; he had no involvement in this
portion of the investigation. Two days later, [the former State
employee] ended employment with the AG’s Office.
[The firm] responded to the July 18, 2003 subpoena on August
20th, after [the former State employee] was recused from
[the firm] and all other securities matters, but prior to [the former
State employee] having left the AG’s Office. One of AAG’s
working on the investigation believes he received a phone call from an
attorney representing one of the brokers, indicating that a timing
agreement asked for in the July 18th subpoena had never
been executed. Other than this call, the AG believes that there
were no other communications prior to July 23, 2003.
On September 3, 2003, the AG’s Office filed its complaint against Canary,
based on charges that it had engaged in illegal trading with several
large mutual fund companies and entered into a $40 million settlement.6 The AG’s press release indicated
that it had obtained evidence of widespread illegal trading schemes, such
as late trading and market timing, which cost mutual fund shareholders
billions of dollars annually, that its investigation of the mutual fund
industry was on-going, and that the full extent of the fraud was not yet
known.
The next day, on September 4, 2003, the SEC sent [the firm] and many
other Wall Street firms two subpoenas, one of which concerns time trading
and late trading. The SEC’s subpoenas are broader in scope than
those issued by the AG and seek information concerning the handling of
customer orders and the redemption practices of mutual fund shares.
[The former State employee] has reviewed the subpoenas and views them as
significantly broader and more industry-wide than either of the AG’s
subpoenas. [The former State employee] states that the SEC was not
informed of the AG’s activities and the Canary case.
Finally, on September 10 and 11, 2003, the SEC sent two additional
subpoenas to [the firm]: the first deals with “timing” issues and mutual
funds in the broadest sense, as well as the violation and redemption of
mutual fund shares, and the second “is examining practices by investment
companies” concerning their overseas pricing of foreign funds and
portfolios of securities.
The Massachusetts Investigation
On Thursday, July 10, 2003, the Director for the Massachusetts Security
Division, [‘the Director”], telephoned [the former State employee]
inviting him and Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to attend a news
conference on the following Monday at which the Massachusetts Secretary
of State, William F. Galvin (“Galvin”) would announce a complaint against
[the firm]. The complaint concerned [the firm’s] response to a
regulatory inquiry that Massachusetts viewed as either incomplete or
false, and arose in the context of an investigation concerning whether
[the firm] had improperly held sales contests to boost sales of its
mutual funds, whether brokers received better commissions for selling one
product over another and the adequacy of the disclosures in this area.
[The director] wanted Mr. Spitzer to attend the press conference and lend
his support.
Over the weekend, [the former State employee] and Mr. Spitzer read the
complaint that would be filed on Monday and [the former State employee]
helped prepare Mr. Spitzer over the weekend (Attachment A). At the
time, [the former State employee] understood that he was receiving no
confidential information about the Massachusetts investigation of [the
firm]. Mr. Spitzer’s reason for attending was to warn the public
that similar State probes could be prohibited if controversial
legislation in Congress, which would bar State regulators from
investigating similar practices, were to become law.7
Mr. Spitzer and [the former State employee] attended the press
conference held on July 14, 2003. [The former State employee]
states that he simply observed the conference and attended a brief
pre-press conference meeting between Galvin, [the Director], and Mr.
Spitzer. On August 11, 2003, after [the former State employee] had
recused from all [matter regarding the firm] and securities matters,
Massachusetts filed its second action against [the firm], concerning the
alleged sales practices and sales contest violations.8 [The former State employee]
states that he never received any confidential information from
Massachusetts beyond what was eventually disclosed either in the original
complaint concerning [the firm’s] alleged false filing to regulators or
in the subsequent August 11th complaint.
[The former State employee] and the AG’s Office state that their office
neither separately nor jointly conducted any investigation into this
matter, nor the issues in general, notwithstanding a press release issued
by Massachusetts and the AG’s Office at that time, that a joint
investigation was being conducted. [The firm] has asked [the former
State employee] to work on the Massachusetts action and on an SEC
investigation into similar issues. According to [the former State
employee], the SEC probe is not primarily concerned with sales contests
but encompasses issues with respect to the sale of mutual funds beyond
that covered by the Massachusetts complaint. The SEC investigation
predates the Massachusetts investigation, which began in March,
2003.
Secretary Galvin has objected to [the former State employee’s]
participation in the Massachusetts action and [the former State employee]
has agreed not to appear before Massachusetts in connection with that
case. In addition, since then, other jurisdictions have commenced
investigations into similar issues involving the issue of sales
contests.
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS PRESENTED
[The former State employee] asks (1) whether he may work on [the firm’s]
response to the SEC subpoenas that followed after the AG announced the
Canary settlement in early September, (2) whether he may work on the
response to the SEC subpoenas relating to the Massachusetts
investigation, (3) whether he may work on the investigations concerning
sales contests from jurisdictions other than New York, and (4) whether he
may provide advice to [the firm] in the context of the company’s business
plan relating to mutual fund sales.
APPLICABLE STATUTES
The statutory language setting forth the two year bar is found in Public
Officers Law §73(8)(a)(i), which provides as follows:
No person who has served as a state officer or employee shall
within a period of two years after the termination of such service or
employment appear or practice before such state agency or receive
compensation for any services rendered by such former officer or
employee on behalf of any person, firm, corporation, or association in
relation to any case, proceeding or application or other matter before
such agency.
The lifetime bar found in Public Officers Law §73(8)(a)(ii) states, in
relevant part, that:
No person who has served as a state officer or employee shall after
the termination of such service or employment appear, practice,
communicate or otherwise render services before any state agency or
receive compensation for any such services rendered by such former
officer or employee on behalf of any person, firm, corporation or
other entity in relation to any case, proceeding, application or
transaction with respect to which such person was directly concerned
and in which he or she personally participated during the period of
his or her service or employment, or which was under his or her active
consideration.
The above restrictions set the ground rules for what individuals may
do with the knowledge, experience and contacts gained from public
service after they leave their employment with a State agency.
The two-year bar prohibits former State officers and employees from
appearing, practicing or rendering services for compensation in
relation to any case, proceeding, application or other matter before
their former agency for two years following their separation from
State service. A second provision, known as the “lifetime bar,”
prohibits former State officers and employees from appearing,
practicing, communicating or rendering services before any State
agency for compensation, and rendering services for compensation in
relation to any case, proceeding or transaction with respect to which
they were directly concerned and in which they personally
participated during the period of their State service, or which
was under their active consideration during that period.
DISCUSSION
The Two Year Bar
Since he is subject to the restrictions of the two year bar, [the
former State employee] may not appear or practice before the AG or
render compensated services in relation to a matter before the AG.
[The former State employee] has asserted to the Commission that he
does not intend to appear, practice or render services for
compensation before the AG during his two-year period, which will
effectively run through August 23, 2005.
In essence, the restrictions of the two-year bar mean that [the former
State employee] may not participate, passively or otherwise, in any
meetings, discussions, telephone calls, or be the recipient of
documents, pertaining to the AG’s investigation of [the firm].
In addition, he may not review documents or testimony, or review or
provide input into submissions that are relevant to any AG
investigation. While there may be situations in which counsel
for [the firm] may wish to discuss the response to both the AG and the
SEC subpoenas or the investigation in general, or request his presence
in meetings where both investigations are discussed, [the former State
employee] is cautioned to recuse himself from any participation in the AG’s portion of the investigation.9
In Advisory Opinion No. 99-03, the Commission noted the difficulty in
providing guidance to a former employee of the Banking Department
(“Department”) when she proposed to work for a consulting firm
retained by a bank to conduct an investigation which had been ordered
by the Federal Reserve Bank (“FRB”). The bank was also regulated
by the Department, and the FRB was authorized, but not required, to
share information with the Department regarding the
investigation. Whether she would render services in a matter
before the Department was not “foreseeable” because the former
employee could not possibly know what the investigation would reveal
as it progressed.
The Commission went on to hold that should the investigation come
before the Department she would be required, at that time, to withdraw
from the matter.
Investigations, by their very nature, make it impossible to know what
information will be uncovered and revealed, and who may be involved,
either as a witness or a subject of the inquiry. In this case,
the AG and the SEC are now probing the very same issues and activities
involving [the firm’s] trading practices and its selling of mutual
funds. The issues are sufficiently similar so that the
likelihood exists that the AG and the SEC will at least coexist, and
may logically combine forces in a collaborative effort.10 If actionable conduct is discovered, past practice
suggests a settlement with federal and state regulators similar to the
one reached with the Wall Street firms in the investment banking
research cases in 2002. Under the circumstances, [the former
State employee] would not be permitted to participate in any aspect of
the matter that is before the AG or that is jointly before the AG and
the SEC, or the AG and some other jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts
. Furthermore, he would be required to withdraw from a matter at
the time he becomes aware that the AG is involved in the matter.
The Lifetime Bar
For the Commission to determine whether the lifetime bar prohibits
[the former State employee] from representing [the firm] in the
on-going investigations which involve the trading practices of mutual
funds and sales contests, two issues must be addressed: (1) whether
[the former State employee’s] activities while in State service were
such that he personally participated in and was directly
concerned with, or actively considered, either of the
investigations, and, if they were, (2) whether the investigation is
the same “case, proceeding, application or transaction” as the
investigation [the former State employee] worked on while with the AG.
As noted above, the post-employment restriction is intended to prevent
former State officers and employees from utilizing their “insider”
knowledge of specific projects for their own benefit or that of a
client. Questions involving applications of the lifetime bar
must be made on a case-by-case basis (see,
Advisory Opinion No. 90-22).
In Advisory Opinion No. 93-13, the Commission held that decisive to a
finding of whether a former employee personally participated in and
was directly concerned with, or actively considered a transaction, is
whether the former employee had some official State role in effecting
the outcome of the transaction. In that case, the Commission
held that while the employee was “interested” in the outcome, his
interest did not rise to the level of direct concern to invoke the
lifetime bar.
In Advisory Opinion No. 95-41, a former AAG sought to represent a
party in a civil proceeding that was related to a criminal matter in
which the attorney had a supervisory role. The former AAG sought
to represent a defendant in a civil suit brought by the City of Utica
, alleging that the defendants were liable for costs it incurred due
to the release of hazardous substances at a site. Certain
individuals were indicted in State court for criminal violations of
the State’s environmental laws, which were prosecuted by the AG’s
Office. As a State employee, the former AAG’s involvement was
limited to the review of the indictments for form. The former
AAG did not have any substantive input into the decisions to initiate
the investigation or to seek the indictments. The Commission
held that the former employee’s limited involvement in the criminal
matter while he served in the AG’s Office was not such that he
personally participated in and was directly concerned with the matter,
or that he had it under his active consideration.
[The former State employee’s] Participation in the AG’s
Investigation into Mutual Fund Trading Practices
In the instant case, [the former State employee] had overall
supervisory responsibilities concerning the mutual fund investigation
at the time the July 18, 2003 subpoena was issued to [the firm]
primarily concerning two of its brokers, although he did not sign the
subpoena nor know of its existence until later. At the time [the
firm] made its initial response to the subpoena on August 20, 2003,
and by the time that the AG issued its second, broader subpoena to
[the firm], [the former State employee] had recused from all [of the
firm’s matters] and securities-related matters. Based on the
foregoing, the Commission finds that while [the former State
employee’s] role as supervisor may have otherwise triggered the
lifetime bar, given the brief period of time between the issuance of
the July 18, 2003 subpoena and his recusal from [the firm’s] matters,
the Commission concludes that the lifetime bar does not apply to the
instant circumstances.
In Advisory Opinion No. 92-20, the Commission held that for an agency
head, transactions handled by senior staff are imputed to him or
her. However, in that opinion, the Commission said that it “was
aware of the hazard of imputing all actions of staff to the supervisor
for purposes of determining whether there has been a violation of the
ethics law.” In the instant case, the Commission is aware that
during the period in question, the AG’s Office was issuing scores of
subpoenas to the securities industry, and to impute the narrower and
broader [the firm] subpoenas to [the former State employee] at a time
when he asserts having had no knowledge of the subpoenas, or, by the
time he had been recused from all [the firm] and securities-related
matters, would be inconsistent with the Commission’s historical
application of the lifetime bar.
Even if the Commission were to conclude that the lifetime bar applies
because [the former State employee] was the supervisor at the time the
first subpoenas were issued, the Commission would be reluctant to
conclude that the SEC investigation is the “same transaction” because
the Commission notes that the SEC began its investigation after
the AG publicly announced its settlement with Canary identifying the
improper trading techniques now under scrutiny by the SEC. Thus,
given the independent nature of the SEC investigation and the five day
period of time in which [the former State employee] had a supervisory
role in the investigation (from July 18, 2003, when his subordinates
issued the subpoena to [the firm] and July 23, 2003, when he recused
from [the firm’s] matters), the Commission finds that it would be
unwarranted to invoke the lifetime bar to these specific set of
facts.
[The former State employee’s] participation in the
Massachusetts investigation involving whether [the firm] has
improperly held “sales contests” to sell mutual funds
[The former State employee] attended the July 14, 2003 press
conference announcing a complaint against [the firm] concerning an
incomplete or false response relating to an inquiry relating to sales
contests. The AG’s Office did not conduct an investigation into
this issue, but maintains that it attended the press conference solely
to alert investors and the public about legislation in Congress that
would preempt State action into similar cases. At the time
Massachusetts filed a second complaint against [the firm] alleging
improper sales contests, [the former State employee] had recused from
[the firm] matters. Neither he nor the AG’s Office investigated
these matters prior to his departure. While the SEC
investigation predated the Massachusetts investigation, [the former
State employee] had no substantive knowledge of the SEC investigation.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that [the former State
employee’s] limited involvement at the Massachusetts press conference
did not rise to the level of having direct concern, personal
participation or active consideration in relation to the investigation
concerning sales contests.11
Although the timing of [the former State employee’s] departure from
the AG’s Office, on the verge of a broadening investigation into [the
firm’s] trading practices merits attention, evidence that [the former
State employee] had insider information that could benefit his current
employer in the SEC investigation into similar and other issues is to
the contrary.
Notwithstanding the above, [the former State employee] is reminded
that the lifetime bar would preclude him from having any involvement
on behalf of [the firm] or any other entity with regard to [the
firm’s] settlement with the AG over its research practices (the 2002
Global Resolution) as well as the AG’s complaint and settlement with
Canary as they are transactions which [the former State employee]
actively considered, personally participated or was directly
concerned. Given his prominent position at the AG’s Office,
there may be additional transactions for which [the former State
employee] faces a lifetime bar prohibition and he is encouraged to
contact the Commission for further guidance.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the two-year bar, [the former State employee] may render
services in connection with SEC investigations of [the firm], as long
as the investigation is not a matter that comes before the AG;
should the investigation come before the AG, he must withdraw from the
matter that is before the AG or from matters that are jointly before
the AG, the SEC or any other jurisdiction. The lifetime bar does
not preclude him from working on the SEC subpoenas involving time
trading and market timing, and the SEC subpoenas and investigations
from other jurisdictions on [the firm’s] sales practices.
He may advise [the firm] on their sales practices as long as in doing
so he does not appear, practice or renders services for compensation
in any matter before the AG for the remainder of his two-year bar and
does not render assistance with regard to the 2002 Global Resolution
for which he is lifetime barred.
This opinion, unless and until amended or revoked, is binding on the
Commission in any subsequent proceeding concerning the person who
requested it and who acted in good faith, unless material facts were
omitted or misstated by the person in the request for opinion or
related supporting documentation.
All Concur: Paul Shechtman,
Chair Robert J. Giuffra, Jr.
Lynn Millane,
Members
Dated: October 16 , 2003
End notes
1. On [date], [the firm] agreed to pay
$2 million to settle allegations by NASD of improper sales practices in
which its brokers were encouraged to use prohibited contests to favor the
sale of [the firm’s] mutual funds.
2. Under the terms of its agreement
with the AG, [the firm] adopted all of the terms and provisions of the
Global Resolution, paid a fine of $50 million and contributed $75 million
to an independent research fund.
3. The technique of timing is designed
to exploit market inefficiencies when the net asset value (“NAV”) price
of the mutual fund shares, which is set at the 4 p.m. market close, does
not reflect the current market value of the stocks held by the mutual
fund. When a “market timer” buys mutual funds at the stale NAV
price, it realizes a profit when it sells those shares the next trading
day or thereafter. That profit dilutes the value of the shares held
by the long-term investors.
4. The AG is given very broad powers to
enforce the provisions of the Martin Act by means of investigation, civil
actions, and criminal prosecutions. (McKinney’s General Business Law
§352.)
5. [The former State employee] was [ ]
of the Investment Protection Bureau; [ ] was Deputy [ ] and [ ] and [ ],
among others, were AAGs in that unit.
6. The settlement agreement included
two Canary-related entities and Edward J. Stern, the managing
principal. Canary obtained special trading opportunities with
leading mutual fund families, including Bank of America’s Nations Funds,
Banc One, Janus and Strong, pursuant to undisclosed agreements that
involved substantial benefits for the fund management companies.
7. At the time, there was legislation
before a key committee in the United States House of
Representatives which would have, effectively, pre-empted State
action.
8. The Commission notes that
the Massachusetts complaint alleges the sales contest in question
occurred within [the firm’s] Northeast region. An exhibit to the
complaint suggests several branches in New
York State (Fairport, Rochester, New York City)
may have some role in the matter under investigation. The AG would
not confirm or deny whether an investigation has commenced subsequent to
[the former State employee’s] departure.
9. As distinctions between the two
investigations may be difficult to discern, [the former State employee]
is encouraged to contact the Commission for further guidance in specific
situations.
10. For example, on October 2, 2003,
the AG’s Office and the SEC issued a press release announcing criminal
charges and civil charges against a former executive and senior trader
with the Hedge Fund firm, Millennium Partners, L.P., and promising to
work together aggressively to pursue abusive trading practices.
11. Should the AG begin an
investigation with sales contests, the two-year bar would preclude [the former
State employee] from having any role in the AG’s inquiry on behalf of
[the firm].
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